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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Aggregations of economic power typically create the opportunity 
for mischief.1  At times, the magnitude of harm is so high that it simply 
is not worth the risk of allowing such aggregations to form at all.2  The 
antitrust laws, however, cannot condemn every consolidation of market 
power or wealth, since often, the prospect of gaining market dominance 
drives firms to compete and innovate.3  Given the broad and 
prophylactic nature of the language employed in the antitrust statutes,4 
courts need a method of parsing pernicious aggregations of economic 
power from benign ones.5  The antitrust injury doctrine performs this 
function.6
 1. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
1051, 1051 (1979). 
It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in 
interpreting the antitrust laws.  By ‘political values,’ I mean, first, a fear that excessive 
concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and 
second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range 
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare 
of all. 
Id. 
 2. The antitrust laws are frequently described as addressing anticompetitive 
conduct in its incipiency. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 63-698, at 1 (1914) (noting that the 
antitrust laws are meant to target anticompetitive conduct in its nascent stage); see also 
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (“[S]ection 7 was intended . . . 
to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their ‘incipiency.’”). 
 3. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.  
The opportunity to charge monopoly prices – at least for a short period – is what 
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces 
innovation and economic growth. 
Id. 
 4. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978) (noting that the 
broad scope of the provision counsels in favor of expansive interpretation of the 
language in the Clayton Act); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 
334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) (“The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, 
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may 
be perpetrated.”). 
 5. Courts typically condemn “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly 
power] as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
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The antitrust injury requirement is an integral part of the antitrust 
standing inquiry.7  While antitrust standing determines whether the 
correct plaintiff is before the court, the antitrust injury doctrine ensures 
that injuries redressed by the Clayton Act are injuries against which the 
antitrust laws were meant to protect.8  Section 4 of the Clayton Act9 
enables an injured plaintiff to seek treble damages,10 while section 16 of 
the Clayton Act allows a plaintiff to enjoin a transaction that threatens to 
inflict antitrust injury on the plaintiff’s business.11
When a court must decide whether to enjoin a transaction before the 
manifestation of any impermissible anticompetitive effects, it must 
determine the likelihood of such conduct with limited information.12  
Often, a court will have information about a firm’s market share in the 
relevant market.13  Given a firm with a large market share, however, a 
court must still make several assumptions about the firm and the 
relevant market to ascertain whether the firm will abuse its dominant 
position.14  A court must not only assess the likelihood of 
anticompetitive conduct before it has occurred, but also the likelihood 
that the anticompetitive conduct will inflict an injury on the plaintiff that 
the antitrust laws were meant to prevent.15
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 6. Cf. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the 
Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 836 (2001) (explaining that the 
calculation of damages under the antitrust injury doctrine must accurately reflect the 
harm caused by the anticompetitive conduct alone, and not damages caused by 
legitimate competitive behavior).  Additionally, if any benefit was obtained, it must be 
subtracted from the damage calculation. See id. 
 7. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) (“A 
showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establishing 
standing under § 4 . . . .”). 
 8. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 10. Id. (“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained . . . .”). 
 11. See id. § 26 (“Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to 
sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction 
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . 
. .”). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
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The Second Circuit’s opinion in R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever 
N.V.16 offers a notable example of a court presuming antitrust injury and 
enjoining a merger.  The court held that market share data could be used 
to infer a threat of antitrust injury for the purposes of section 16 of the 
Clayton Act.17  Using market share data to presume the threat of 
antitrust injury, as in R.C. Bigelow, a court assumes the ability of the 
parties to abuse their market power.  There are two reasons why 
presuming antitrust injury can be problematic.  First, the antitrust injury 
requirement, as a filtering doctrine, is part of the standing inquiry.  
Courts should use the standing inquiry to focus on whether the plaintiff 
is the appropriate party to bring an antitrust case, rather than to decide 
the merits of a case.18  Second, factors in addition to market share, such 
as barriers to entry in the relevant market, may determine whether a firm 
benefits from anticompetitive conduct.19  For example, firms are 
unlikely to engage in predatory pricing20—the act of pricing goods 
 16. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 17. Id. at 108. 
 18. See Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 
305 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[A]ntitrust injury for standing purposes should be viewed from 
the perspective of the plaintiff’s position in the marketplace, not from the merits-related 
perspective of the impact of a defendant’s conduct on overall competition.”). 
 19. This principle reveals itself through a court’s typical method of market 
analysis.  To determine whether a sub-market exists within a larger market, the smaller 
market must be insulated from entry to the extent that it forms its own self-contained 
market.  For example, in FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997), the 
court considered whether the relevant market encompassed every store that sold office 
supplies, or only superstores that sold office supplies.  The court examined the effect of 
price competition between the two markets and determined that only superstore pricing 
affects other superstore prices. Id. at 1079-80.  The court also noted that other large 
stores that attempted to expand into office supplies were unsuccessful. Id. at 1086-88.  
This line of reasoning demonstrates a need to define a market by its boundaries; that is, 
whether others can easily enter. See generally United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 
F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (resting on the assumption that if firms could enter the sub-
market profitably, they would); United States v. Calamar Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 
(D.N.J. 1985). 
 20. Most scholars agree that predatory pricing is the pricing of goods below some 
measure of cost. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 
(1975); Laura Ferrari Bravo & Paolo Siciliani, Exclusionary Pricing and Consumer 
Harm: The European Commission’s Practice in the DSL Market, 3 J. COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. 243, 258 (2007); Albert A. Foer, Mr. Magoo Visits Wal-Mart: Finding the 
Right Lens for Antitrust, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (2007) (“The illegal act of 
predatory pricing is defined as setting one’s prices below an appropriate measure of 
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below cost to capture market share—due to the difficulty of recouping 
losses sustained on the goods sold.  The firm must simultaneously ward 
off the entry of competitors into the market to recoup the costs of 
predatory pricing.21  In addition, courts struggle to define predatory 
pricing and measure the appropriate cost,22 thus making a presumption 
of predatory conduct based solely on market share even less tenable.  
Rather than presume antitrust injury, a court must judge every form 
of conduct according to its probability of anticompetitive harm.  Each 
set of facts warrants its own individualized inquiry.  Jurisprudence free 
of presumptions will ensure that the court will not make unjustified 
inferences about the defendant or the relevant market. 
II.  THE ANTITRUST INJURY REQUIREMENT 
In addition to meeting Article III standing,23 which requires a 
plaintiff to establish a judicially cognizable case or controversy,24 an 
antitrust plaintiff must also show antitrust standing to sue for treble 
damages or injunctive relief.25  To have standing, a plaintiff must suffer 
an antitrust injury, which is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent.”26  This requirement is most likely a means of 
limiting the broad standing provision of section 4 of the Clayton Act,27 
which states that “any person who shall be injured in his business or 
cost, with the ability to later raise prices sufficiently to recapture the investment made in 
below-cost pricing.”). 
 21. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986) (“The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly 
power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some 
additional gain.”). 
 22. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 24. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“A plaintiff must allege 
personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely 
to be redressed by the requested relief.”). 
 25. See Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (noting 
that antitrust standing and antitrust injury are required for standing for injunctive relief 
under section 16 of the Clayton Act); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 
482 (1982) (noting that antitrust injury is required for standing under the treble damages 
provision of the Clayton Act). 
 26. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).  The Clayton Act contains many of the remedial 
provisions for the antitrust laws.  In particular, the treble damages and injunction 
provisions are found in sections 15 and 26, respectively, of the Clayton Act. 
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property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . 
. .”28  Narrowing the Clayton Act’s broad standing provision increases 
the likelihood that the proper plaintiff will bring suit, rather than a party 
injured by the ripple effects of anticompetitive conduct.29
The language of the Clayton Act does suggest a broader 
interpretation without limiting doctrines like antitrust standing or 
injury.30  In fact, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he unrestrictive 
language of the section, and the avowed breadth of the congressional 
purpose, cautions [against cabining] § 4 in ways that will defeat its 
broad remedial objective.”31  Nevertheless, the prospect of allowing any 
individual to sue for harms they suffer from the mere ripple effects of 
anticompetitive behavior would be repugnant to the spirit of Article III 
of the Constitution,32 which grants jurisdiction over discrete cases and 
controversies, and bars suits based on generalized grievances. 
The Supreme Court has struggled to balance the opposing forces 
implicit in the Clayton Act.33  On one hand, the Court must prevent the 
 28. Id.  The antitrust injury requirement also applies to section 16 of the Clayton 
Act, which empowers a court to hear cases for injunctive relief. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 
122. 
 29. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 476-77. 
 30. Id. at 477. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 476-77 (“An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm 
to flow through the Nation’s economy; but despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a 
point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992). 
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming 
only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution 
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it 
does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy. 
Id.; see also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 616 (1989) (“[G]eneralized 
grievances brought by concerned citizens . . . are not cognizable in the federal courts.”); 
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only 
that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of 
sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. 
Id. 
 33. The Supreme Court has interpreted portions of the Clayton Act expansively in 
light of the broad language used by Congress.  For example, the Supreme Court in 
Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, held that “any person” included a foreign sovereign. 434 
U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978).  In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Court interpreted the phrase 
“property” broadly because of the statute’s broad language and remedial purpose. 442 
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provision from becoming a means of litigating generalized grievances 
and attenuated injuries.34  On the other hand, the Court must give full 
effect to Congress’ remedial intent.35  Because of this need to balance, 
the antitrust standing doctrine incorporates the notion of antitrust injury 
to limit the class of injuries that are actionable under the statute.36  
Certain injuries standing alone, such as an increase in prices, might not 
be enough for antitrust injury purposes.37  The antitrust injury analysis 
requires that courts examine the injury sustained, the purpose of the 
antitrust laws creating the cause of action, and the causal link between 
the two.38
A.  What the Antitrust Law were Meant to Protect Against: Early 
Supreme Court Decisions 
To determine whether an antitrust injury exists, one must 
understand what protections antitrust laws were meant to afford.  The 
U.S. 330, 338 (1979).  The Court has also noted that the statute should not be construed 
to allow any person to recover for the ripple effects of anti-competitive behavior. See 
McCready, 457 U.S. at 465. 
 34. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 
459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983) (noting that while Article III standing ensures that the 
plaintiff has been injured, antitrust injury goes further by ensuring that the proper 
plaintiff is before the court). 
 35. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1990) 
(“Section 4 of the Clayton Act is a remedial provision that makes available treble 
damages to ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.’”); see also Matthew R. Dorsett, Diamonds Are 
a Cartel’s Best Friend: The Rise and Fall of Anticompetitive Business Practices Within 
De Beers’s International Diamond Cartel, 16 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 162 
n.158 (“The Clayton Act also contains the primary remedial provisions of the antitrust 
laws.”). 
 36. See Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust 
Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 
295 (1998) (noting that antitrust injury facilitates a standing inquiry that limits the class 
of plaintiffs that can sue to those within the “zone of interests” of the antitrust laws). 
 37. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 n.10 
(1977) (holding that the acquisition of bowling allies that would have gone out of 
business if not acquired did not confer standing on the plaintiffs because the injury did 
not result from a lessening of competition, but from the maintenance of competitive 
levels). 
 38. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. at 535 (noting that 
proximate cause is the crux of the standing analysis and that courts have often resolved 
such issues with common law causation doctrines). 
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scope of standing under the antitrust laws changes when viewed as a 
means of maximizing economic efficiency, rather than as a vehicle to 
favor small business over large conglomerates, or to protect the end 
consumer.39  If courts focus on promoting efficiency, then market 
inefficiencies can give rise to suit under the Clayton Act’s injunctive 
relief and trebling provisions.40  However, under a small business 
protection rationale, a transaction beyond a certain size could 
sufficiently threaten small business to warrant judicial intervention.41  
Likewise, under the consumer protection model, parties all the way 
down the vertical supply chain could have standing to sue, creating the 
threat of duplicative recovery.42  Not only could ultimate consumers sue 
due to the higher price forced upon them by anti-competitive conduct, 
middlemen could sue, too.43
No single policy successfully encapsulates the purposes of the 
antitrust laws.44  Economic efficiency is certainly a large part of the 
 39. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 720c 
(1978); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
386-87 (Basic Books 1978). 
 40. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.3b (3d ed. 2005). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1966) 
(holding that a 7.5% market share was adequate to condemn a grocery store merger 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act); see also id. at 283-84 (“Another, more generalized, 
congressional purpose revealed by the legislative history was to protect small 
businessmen and to stem the rising tide of concentration in the economy.”). 
 42. See Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (rejecting the offensive use of 
“passing on” theory); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 
(1968) (rejecting a “passing on” defense). 
 43. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 737. 
Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would transform treble-
damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential 
plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge—from direct purchasers to 
middlemen to ultimate consumers.  However appealing this attempt to allocate the 
overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity 
to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness. 
Id. 
 44. See BORK, supra note 39, at 427 (stating that the antitrust laws have been 
justified as a means of promoting consumer welfare); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW 27 (2d ed. 2001) (expressing that the antitrust laws are also a means of ensuring 
economically efficient markets); Richard M. Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: 
Restoring “Local Control” as a Factor in Merger Policy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 149, 193-94 
(2006) (asserting that, to some extent, the antitrust laws probably reflect an attempt to 
accomplish several regulatory goals). 
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statutory scheme, but so is consumer protection.  Nevertheless, a court 
must first determine whether the antitrust laws are meant to shield the 
party from the injury they sustained.45  Often, a consumer protection 
approach gives rise to the threat of duplicative recovery,46 while the 
economic efficiency rationale gives rise to the possibility of remedying 
attenuated injuries dispersed throughout the entire economy.47  Rather 
than elucidate what the antitrust laws mean in every case, the Supreme 
Court applies a case by case approach.48
Two Supreme Court decisions elaborate what the antitrust laws 
were meant to prevent within the context of the antitrust injury 
requirement: Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.49 and Blue 
Shield of Virginia v. McCready.50  The two cases, taken together, present 
two underlying principles of the antitrust injury requirement.  First, the 
antitrust laws are not meant to shield a party from competition.51  
Second, the antitrust laws are meant to redress injuries resulting from 
anticompetitive behavior.52  The simultaneous need to redress injury and 
foster competition have forced the court to focus on the causal nexus 
between the purpose of the antitrust laws and the injury asserted to 
determine whether antitrust injury exists. 
 45. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (“Instead, 
a plaintiff must prove the existence of antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977))). 
 46. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n.14 (1972) (“Measurement 
of an injury to the general economy, on the other hand, necessarily involves an 
examination of the impact of a restraint of trade upon every variable that affects the 
State’s economic health—a task extremely difficult ‘in the real economic world rather 
than an economist’s hypothetical model.’”). 
 47. See id.  In other contexts, injuries dispersed across the national economy pose 
similar remedial problems. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 489. 
 48. See Ronald W. Davis, Standing On Shaky Ground: The Strangely Elusive 
Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 758 (“Prudence might well 
indicate that it is best to proceed on a case-by-case basis, eschewing for the moment this 
particular generalization about antitrust injury.”). Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 
 49. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 50. 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
 51. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
 52. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 472. 
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1.  Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat: The Antitrust Laws Do Not 
Protect Against the Forces of Competition 
The Brunswick decision was one of the first Supreme Court cases to 
announce the rule that the injury sustained must be of a type that the 
antitrust laws were meant to prevent.53  Further, Brunswick stands for 
the proposition that injury-in-fact resulting from competitive forces is, 
by itself, never sufficient to meet the antitrust injury requirement.54
In Brunswick, the Court dealt with a merger that was the product of 
a sharp decline in the bowling industry.55  Brunswick was one of the two 
largest producers of bowling equipment.56  The bowling centers to 
whom Brunswick sold equipment began to suffer from an industry-wide 
decline.57  As a result, Brunswick could either foreclose on the bowling 
equipment it had sold to the bowling centers, or it could buy out the 
bowling centers and operate them to recoup the debt.58  Naturally, 
Brunswick chose the latter.59  After all, there would not be much of a 
market for repossessed bowling equipment in the midst of an industry 
slump. 
A competing company that operated bowling centers brought suit, 
claiming that the acquisitions violated section 7 of the Clayton Act,60 
and sued for both treble damages under section 461 and injunctive relief 
under section 16 of the Act.62  The Third Circuit sided with the 
plaintiffs,63 noting that if the bowling centers were not acquired by 
Brunswick they would have gone out of business, allowing the 
competing bowling alleys a greater share of the market.64
 
 53. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
 54. See id. at 488. 
 55. Id. at 479. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 479-80. 
 59. Id. at 480. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 61. Id. § 16. 
 62. Id. § 26; Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 480-81. 
 63. See NBO Indus. Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 272-73 (3d 
Cir. 1975). 
 64. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 482-84; see also NBO Indus. Treadway, 523 F.2d at 
272-73. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Third Circuit’s 
“holding divorces antitrust recovery from the purposes of the antitrust 
laws without a clear statutory command to do so.”65  In particular, the 
Court recognized that every merger would force certain economic 
readjustments, which under the Third Circuit’s reasoning would make 
virtually every causally related injury actionable,66 even injuries that the 
antitrust laws were not meant to prevent.67  The Court continued, noting 
that the antitrust laws only condemn mergers “when they may produce 
anticompetitive effects.”68  The Third Circuit requires only a showing 
that the plaintiffs are worse off after the merger.69  This means all 
injuries resulting from the merger would be actionable, regardless of the 
reasons for condemning the merger.70  In the Court’s words, such a rule 
would make recovery “entirely fortuitous, and would authorize damages 
for losses which are of no concern to the antitrust laws.”71
Applied to the facts of the Brunswick case, the injury sustained by 
the plaintiffs would not be enough to bring an action under the remedial 
provisions of the antitrust laws.72  The plaintiff asserted that Brunswick 
prevented the bowling centers from going out of business, in essence 
precluding the plaintiffs from expanding their market share by virtue of 
less competition.73  Justice Marshall, writing for the Brunswick court, 
summarized that “it is quite clear that if respondents were injured, it was 
not ‘by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws’: while [the] 
loss occurred ‘by reason of’ the unlawful acquisitions, it did not occur 
‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions unlawful.”74  Thus, the 
merger itself might have been an unlawful attempt to monopolize the 
industry, and the injury to the competing bowling centers might have 
 65. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“[U]nder the Court of Appeals’ holding, once a merger is found to violate § 
7, all dislocations caused by the merger are actionable, regardless of whether those 
dislocations have anything to do with the reason the merger was condemned.”). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 489 (“We therefore hold that [for] the plaintiffs to recover treble 
damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked 
to an illegal presence in the market.”). 
 73. See id. at 488 (“The damages respondents obtained are designed to provide 
them with the profits they would have realized had competition been reduced.”). 
 74. Id. at 488. 
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been causally related, but the injury was not sustained because of an 
effect that the antitrust laws were meant to prevent; the injury was the 
effect of an increase in competition.75
2.  Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready: The Antitrust Laws Redress 
Anticompetitive Harm 
While the Brunswick decision stands for the proposition that the 
antitrust laws are not meant to insulate competitors from competition, 
the McCready decision stands for the Clayton Act’s broad remedial 
purpose.76  Blue Shield, the defendant in that case, would only 
reimburse patients for psychotherapy administered by a psychiatrist,77 
but not by a psychologist, unless billed through a physician.78  
McCready, a patient, was denied reimbursement for psychotherapy 
administered by a psychologist and brought a class action suit against 
the insurance provider, alleging an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade 
under section 1 of the Sherman Act.79  The Sherman Act prohibits 
parties from entering into relationships that unreasonably restrain 
trade.80  To redress the Sherman Act claims, the plaintiffs sought treble 
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.81
After the district court held that McCready lacked standing,82 the 
Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.83  The Supreme Court affirmed, 
and in doing so noted the broad remedial purpose of the Clayton Act’s 
treble damages provision.84  The Act protected “all who are made 
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be 
perpetrated.”85  The Court also noted that “[a]n antitrust violation may 
be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow through the Nation’s 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982). 
 77. Id. at 468. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 468-70. 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States”). 
 81. Id. § 15. 
 82. See McCready v. Blue Shield of Va., 649 F.2d 228, 230 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 83. Id. at 232. 
 84. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). 
 85. Id. 
2008 ASSESSING ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM 341 
 
economy; but despite the broad wording of § 4 there is a point beyond 
which the wrongdoer should not be held liable.”86
Nevertheless, the Court ultimately predicated its holding that 
McCready had standing on the remedial purpose of the Clayton Act.87  
Although individuals should not be permitted to bring suit for injuries 
sustained by the economy as a whole,88 a plaintiff need not wait until 
driven from the market before suing.89  The Court concluded that it was 
“unable to identify any persuasive rationale upon which McCready 
might be denied redress under § 4 for the injury she claims.”90
In upholding McCready’s standing, the Court rejected the argument 
that since McCready’s employers paid for the insurance, not McCready, 
the plaintiff had no standing.91  Although McCready was not a 
competitor, the injury suffered was inextricably intertwined with the 
anticompetitive conduct.92  That is, the insurance company inflicted its 
injury on the psychologist by denying reimbursement to the patient.93
The McCready case provides important insight into the nature of 
the antitrust injury inquiry.  Three principles are at work: the purpose of 
the antitrust laws, the need to remedy injuries, and the causal nexus 
between the injury and the antitrust laws.  If any one of these policies is 
evoked to a greater extent than another, a court will find antitrust injury.  
In McCready, two principles were quite pronounced.  First, the patients 
denied reimbursement demonstrated sufficient need to remedy the 
injuries they sustained.94  Second, the health care providers violated 
antitrust law by denying the patients’ reimbursement claims.95  The 
policies of remedying causally air-tight injuries became more important 
than abstract pronouncements about what the antitrust laws were meant 
to prevent. 
 86. Id. at 476-77. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. at 482 (“Indeed, as we made clear in a footnote to the relied-upon passage, a 
§ 4 plaintiff need not ‘prove an actual lessening of competition in order to recover.  
[Competitors] may be able to prove antitrust injury before they actually are driven from 
the market and competition is thereby lessened.’” (citation omitted)). 
 90. Id. at 485. 
 91. Id. at 480-81. 
 92. See id. at 484. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 484-85. 
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B.  The Rule that Emerges 
Brunswick underscores that antitrust laws are not intended to 
insulate competitors from the forces of competition,96 while McCready 
demonstrates the importance of the Clayton Act’s remedial purpose and 
the importance of the causal nexus between the policies behind the act 
and the injury sustained.97  In the aggregate, the antitrust injury 
requirement ensures that standing is not conferred on too broad a class; 
that is, it is not conferred on a class of individuals that are only injured 
by the (sometimes brutal) forces of competition. 
The antitrust laws do have an important remedial purpose.98  
Although a narrow standing doctrine ensures that courts are not 
overburdened by dockets full of claims for the redress of attenuated 
injuries predicated on the ripples of generalized economic harm, a court 
should not lose sight of its purpose: to vindicate rights and to redress 
injury.99  Regardless of whether the purpose of the antitrust laws is 
economic efficiency or consumer protection, federal claims must 
implicate concrete cases and controversies.  McCready makes it clear 
that where an injury is so causally related to the breach of the antitrust 
laws, it must be redressed, and the antitrust laws must be interpreted to 
remedy such injuries.100
 96. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“The 
damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would 
have realized had competition been reduced.  The antitrust laws, however, were enacted 
for ‘the protection of competition not competitors.’”) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 97. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 477 (“[T]he unrestrictive language of the section, 
and the avowed breadth of the congressional purpose, cautions us not to cabin § 4 in 
ways that will defeat its broad remedial objective.”). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (noting that indirect harm does 
not necessarily preclude an individual from standing); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.”). 
 100. See, e.g., McCready, 457 U.S. at 477. 
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C.  The Antitrust Injury Requirement and Section 16 of the Clayton Act 
Many of the cases discussing the antitrust injury requirement 
involve treble damage actions under section 4 of the Clayton Act.101  
Private enforcement is integral to a court’s ability to invoke equitable 
power and enjoin a potentially anticompetitive transaction.102  Thus, 
section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes a court to grant injunctive relief 
to “any person, firm, corporation, or association”103 to remedy 
“threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .”104  
The breadth of the provision’s language is as staggering as the treble 
damage provision in section 4, which states that “any person who shall 
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in 
the antitrust laws may sue . . . .”105
However, notable differences exist between the language of section 
16 and section 4 that may make the antitrust injury requirement slightly 
different.  Most notably, section 16 talks of “threatened loss or 
damage,”106 while section 4 does not.107  Section 4 recognizes injuries to 
“business or property,”108 but section 16 makes no such qualification.109  
These differences point to the possibility that the remedial scope of 
section 16 might be broader.  However, the scope of section 4 is, on its 
face, broader than section 16 because section 4 allows suit for “anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws.”110  If section 4 lends sanction to broad 
remedial interpretations of the provision,111 then the absence of such a 
provision in section 16 may imply that a tighter causal nexus is required 
for injunctive relief than for treble damages.  Ultimately, the differences 
 101. See Jonathan L. Disenhaus, Competitor Standing to Challenge a Merger of 
Rivals: The Applicability Of Strategic Behavior Analysis, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2057, 2057 
(1987) (“Few private plaintiffs sought to enjoin illegal mergers through the standing 
granted them by section 16 of the Clayton Act.”). 
 102. See id. at 2058-59. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 15. 
 106. Id. § 26. 
 107. See id. § 15. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. § 26. 
 110. Id. § 15. 
 111. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting the 
broad remedial purpose of the Clayton Act); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977) (noting that the injury must be of the type the 
antitrust laws were meant to protect against). 
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are not determinative, and it is difficult to conclude which provision 
merits broader construction. 
Ignoring the textual differences between the provisions, the 
Supreme Court has held that both sections 16 and 4 require antitrust 
injury.112  Courts, however, have interpreted section 16 more broadly 
than section 4 by allowing suit for injunctive relief for anticompetitive 
conduct that has simply threatened loss or injury, absent actual injury.113  
That section 16 has no business or property qualification, as in section 4, 
bolsters this interpretation, implying that threatened injury need not 
manifest itself as actual injury before a court can hear a case for 
injunctive relief. 
The Supreme Court faced the issue of parity between sections 4 and 
16 in Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.114  The fifth largest beef 
packer, Monfort,115 brought suit to enjoin a merger between two of its 
competitors, the second and third largest meat packers in the market.116  
Monfort brought suit under section 16 of the Clayton Act,117 alleging 
that if the merger was consummated it would violate section 7 of the 
Clayton Act,118 which prohibits mergers that substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly.119
Monfort theorized that the size of the merged entity would allow it 
to engage in a “price-cost squeeze.”120  By lowering prices to cost or just 
above cost, a competitor’s profit margins would fall, slowly driving the 
competitor out of business.121  Monfort conceded that its “operations 
were as efficient as those [of its merging competitors and that] only 
below-cost pricing could remove Monfort as an obstacle.”122  The Court 
 112. See Cargill, Inc., v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986) (“We hold 
that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act must show a 
threat of antitrust injury, and that a showing of loss or damage due to merely increased 
competition does not constitute such injury.”). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. at 111. 
 115. Id. at 106. 
 116. Id. 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006). 
 118. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 107. 
 119. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 120. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 108. 
 121. See id. at 114-15. 
 122. Id. at 115 n.10. 
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used this concession to conclude that absent an allegation of below-cost 
pricing, Monfort would not sustain antitrust injury.123
The Court then turned to whether Excel, the surviving competitor 
after the companies merged, engaged or was likely to engage in 
predatory pricing.124  The Court defined predatory pricing as “pricing 
below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating 
competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long 
run.”125  Noting the pernicious effect of predatory pricing,126 the Court 
scoured the record for an allegation of the practice and found none, 
leading to a reversal of the Second Circuit’s contrary decision.127
In Cargill, the Supreme Court resolved whether the antitrust injury 
requirement extended to injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton 
Act.128  The Court, confronting the issue of granting injunctive relief 
based on speculative claims of injury that may result from post-merger 
actions,129 weighed the risk of frustrating competition against the 
possibility of an anticompetitive transaction.130  The Court rejoined that 
it would make little sense to deny a party standing to challenge a 
transaction just because the anticompetitive conduct rarely occurs.131  
The likelihood of predatory conduct would largely depend on the 
likelihood that the predatory firm could recoup the losses sustained 
while engaging in predatory pricing.132  However, the Court also 
recognized that the mechanism a firm would use to engage in predatory 
pricing is the same mechanism that a firm would use to compete—they 
would lower prices.133  Although predatory pricing is difficult to 
assume, the Court nevertheless refused to deny standing to the plaintiffs 
simply because the defendants were unlikely to engage in the 
anticompetitive conduct.134
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 118-20. 
 125. Id. at 117. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. at 121. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 122 n.17 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 122. 
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The Court ultimately held that “a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief 
under § 16 of the Clayton Act must show a threat of antitrust injury, and 
that a showing of loss or damage due merely to increased competition 
does not constitute such injury.”135  This brought the requirements for 
injunctive relief in line with the antitrust injury requirement articulated 
by Brunswick and McCready—a causal nexus must exist between the 
injury and the purpose of the antitrust laws, and injury sustained from 
the effects of competition alone are never enough to confer standing. 
D.  The Problem With Finding Antitrust Injury Before the 
Transaction Is Consummated 
Without the benefit of hindsight to assess the causal connection 
between an actual injury and the antitrust violation at issue, a court must 
speculate about the potential effects of a transaction.136  Further, the 
prophylactic nature of the antitrust laws makes it more difficult to 
minimize the speculative analysis.  For example, section 7 of the 
Clayton Act prohibits mergers that lessen competition or tend to create 
monopolies.137  Acts that focus on stifling competition can also plausibly 
point to the natural effects of competitive behavior.138
In the case of a merger that has not yet been consummated, there is 
no surefire way of knowing how a company will use its post-merger 
market power.  Typically, the threat of antitrust injury will stem from 
what a merged entity can do, rather than what it is likely to do.  The 
potential for anticompetitive behavior becomes the primary means of 
evaluating the merits of a section 7 claim.139  Predatory pricing is a 
prime example of behavior in which a merged entity could engage.140  
 135. Id. 
 136. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (“A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature 
speculative.  Any agreement below the competitive level requires the conspirators to 
forgo profits that free competition would offer them.”). 
 137. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 138. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589). 
 139. See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1981); Marathon 
Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d 378, 383 (6th Cir. 1981); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 
535 F. Supp. 933, 945 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
 140. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 62 n.252 (2005) (“Theoretically, consumers could sue for an injunction against 
attempted monopolization through predation, but the likelihood that consumers would 
seek equitable remedies in cases without damages is remote.”). 
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However, firms rarely profit from engaging in below-cost pricing,141 
namely because it may not be economically feasible for the merged 
entity to recoup its costs.142  Nevertheless, plaintiffs will still likely 
argue that a defendant will engage in such conduct after it merges. 
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to make an inference one 
way or the other in its antitrust summary judgment jurisprudence when 
the evidence points both ways.143  When the evidence is “consistent with 
permissible competition as [well as] with illegal conspiracy,”144 a court 
cannot “exclude the possibility”145 that the anticompetitive conduct was 
the result of independent action.  Likewise, when a court speculates 
about what a firm will do after merging, the improbability of predatory 
pricing, coupled with the plausibility of competitive conduct using the 
same economic mechanism, makes it difficult for a court to assess the 
potential consequences of a transaction.   
In sum, the antitrust injury requirement becomes difficult to 
evaluate before the consummation of a transaction, simply because the 
antitrust laws are drafted broadly enough to encapsulate both innocent 
and pernicious economic behavior.146  What differentiates the two is the 
injury it inflicts.  If the injury has not yet occurred, a court may have a 
difficult time distinguishing between what the antitrust laws proscribe 
and what is in fact allowed, thus chilling the competitive forces it 
intends to foster.147
 141. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (noting that formulaic 
condemnation of below cost and predatory pricing provides little insight into the effects 
and likelihood of such practices). 
 142. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594-95 (“[P]redatory pricing schemes require 
conspirators to suffer losses in order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, 
the gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail 
than to succeed.”); BORK, supra note 39, at 149-55. 
 143. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588. 
 144. Id. (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. This problem is precisely why summary judgment proceedings in antitrust laws 
pose special problems.  Courts must make determinations of conspiracy or market 
power in violation of antitrust laws without complete information.  Moreover, courts 
must analyze market behavior that can plausibly be framed as competitive.  Thus, courts 
have required that the evidence “tends to exclude the possibility” that the economic 
behavior was legitimate. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764. 
 147. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (“Extreme care [should] be taken 
in formulating [antitrust] rules [on predatory pricing], lest the threat of litigation, 
particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”). 
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III.  DOES SIZE ALWAYS POSE A THREAT OF ANTITRUST INJURY? 
Federal courts have often recognized the threat of consolidated 
economic power.148  They have gone to such great lengths as to favor 
small ventures over large ones.149  Yet, not all aggregations of economic 
power should be regarded as a market evil to be extinguished.  Since the 
prospect of achieving high market share motivates firms to succeed and 
innovate,150 this tension between condemning firms with high market 
share and nurturing the incentive to innovate makes defining a rule for 
enjoining high-concentration mergers rather difficult.  On one hand, the 
probability that a merged entity with a controlling market share will 
abuse its position, even if miniscule, may be too large a risk when 
multiplied by the magnitude of potential harm.  On the other hand, a 
mechanical rule that enjoins mergers which cause a concentrated market 
may create a strain of arbitrariness in antitrust jurisprudence.151
The problem compounds when private enforcement is involved.  A 
competitor may have standing to enjoin a merger that concentrates the 
merging companies’ market shares, even if such merger poses little risk 
 148. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (noting that 
concentrations of market share are likely to lessen competition); Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962) (“Congress saw the process of 
concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to assure the Federal 
Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force at its outset and before it 
gathered momentum.”); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 
324 (1897) (“[I]t is not material that the price of an article may be lowered.  It is in the 
power of the combination to raise it . . . .”). 
 149. See Trans-Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 324. 
[I]t is not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes should occur which 
result in transferring an independent business man, the head of his establishment, 
small though it might be into a mere servant or agent of a corporation for selling 
commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the 
business policy of the company and bout to obey orders issued by others. 
Id. 
 150. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (“To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power 
will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive 
conduct.  Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that 
renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”). 
 151. See Robert F. Nostramo, Re-Opening the Door to Antitrust Standing: R.C. 
Bigelow, Inc., v. Unilever N.V., 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 166, 177-78 (1989) (arguing that 
the rule counters the trend away from mechanical condemnation of concentration of 
economic power in antitrust jurisprudence). 
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of abuse.  In particular, low barriers to entry may prevent firms with 
significant market share from charging monopoly prices.  Without 
considering the entire market climate, the rule governing injunctions 
could mechanically inhibit most mergers. 
A.  The R.C. Bigelow Rule 
In R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V.,152 the Second Circuit 
announced a rule that equates market share to the threat of antitrust 
injury.153  In that case, the merger in question would have bestowed 84% 
of the herbal tea market share upon one company.154  A competitor with 
13% of the market share brought suit under section 16 of the Clayton 
Act to enjoin the merger, claiming that the merger would violate section 
7 of the Clayton Act.155
The court found the requisite antitrust injury to enjoin the 
merger,156 relying on United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.157
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage 
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in 
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to 
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the 
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to 
have such anticompetitive effects.158
The court reasoned that firms with a large market concentration 
could too easily abuse their power.159  Thus, the court announced that 
the large market share created a presumption that the merger should be 
enjoined,160 and unless the market data painted an inaccurate picture, the 
 152. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 153. See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 177-78. 
 154. R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 104. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 158. Id. at 363. 
 159. R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (“Whether a proposed merger would 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly is determined through 
findings, for example, ‘that the relative size of the acquiring corporation ha[s] increased 
to such a point that its advantage over competitors threaten[s] to be ‘decisive.’’” 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962))); see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 81-1191, at 8 (1950). 
 160. R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 108 (“While market share data alone does not create 
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presumption would stand.161  The court cited potential for abuse and 
damage to the market in holding that such mergers should be 
enjoined.162  The rule articulated by the R.C. Bigelow court essentially 
stipulated that undue market share automatically confers the required 
antitrust injury to support a competitor’s standing.163
The R.C. Bigelow court purported to apply the Cargill test, which 
issues a section 16 injunction only after a showing of threatened antitrust 
injury.164  However, condemning mergers simply because of size runs 
counter to the prevalent stance taken by other federal courts.  The Fifth 
Circuit, for example, expressed that “the notion that merely facing the 
specter of a monopoly is enough to create standing in a competitor is not 
the law,”165  using Cargill as the basis for its proposition that market 
concentration alone was not enough to confer standing.166
Many other courts agree with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Cargill,167 mainly because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,168 which held that the per se 
illegality of an offense alone did not create a presumption of antitrust 
injury.169  In Atlantic Richfield, the Court held that even a horizontal 
an irrebutable presumption of illegality . . . such a presumption can be overcome only 
by evidence that the market share data gives an ‘inaccurate account of the 
acquisition[‘s] probable effects on competition.’” (quoting United States v. Citizens & 
S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975))). 
 161. See id. (“[U]nless defendants meet their burden of rebutting this presumption, 
the merger must be enjoined.”). 
 162. Id. (citing Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363). 
 163. See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 177-78 (“By equating a substantial market 
share with a threat of antitrust injury, the R.C. Bigelow court has reverted back to the 
mechanical rules thought to have been finally eliminated by Cargill.”). 
 164. See R.C. Bigelow, 867 F.2d at 109-10. 
 165. Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1167 
(W.D. Ark. 1995) (rejecting R.C. Bigelow as contrary to Supreme Court precedent); 
O.K. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 819 F. Supp. 771, 791 (S.D. Ind. 
1992) (noting that the reasoning in R.C. Bigelow conflicts with a subsequent Supreme 
Court decision that refused to presume antitrust injury based on the per se illegality of 
the alleged conduct). 
 168. 495 U.S. 328, 342-43 (1990); see also Cmty. Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1167 
(“No violation of the antitrust laws, even if per se or presumptive, can ever create a 
presumption of antitrust injury.  This point was made clear by the Supreme Court in 
Atlantic Richfield Co . . . .”). 
 169. See Cmty. Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1167-68. 
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price fixing scheme,170 which has been classified as a “hardcore 
offense,”171 was not enough to create a presumption of antitrust 
injury.172  Instead, the Atlantic Richfield Court requires that each 
plaintiff show that it has sustained an injury of the type that the antitrust 
laws were meant to prevent, and that the injury flows from conduct that 
violates those laws.173  Thus, a position that presumes that a merger 
poses a threat of antitrust injury, just by examining the resultant market 
share, is a presumption of the sort the Supreme Court in Atlantic 
Richfield disavowed.174
Many courts began to interpret the R.C Bigelow case as creating a 
presumption of illegality, pitting the Second Circuit’s decision against 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Atlantic Richfield.175  Even courts within 
the Second Circuit were forced to choose between following the R.C. 
Bigelow decision or the Supreme Court.  In Remington Products, Inc. v. 
 170. Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 340.  A horizontal price fixing scheme is when two 
competitors agree to fix prices or restrict output. 
 171. See Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and E.U. Move Towards Substantial Antitrust 
Convergence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, 19 ANTITRUST 18, 19 (2005) 
(“Hardcore restrictions, such as price fixing, output limitation, and allocation of markets 
or customers, are almost always prohibited, irrespective of the parties’ market power.”); 
Jeremy M. Suhr, Keeping the Door Ajar for Foreign Plaintiffs in Global Cartel Cases 
after Empagran, 105 MICH. L. REV. 779, 784 n.38 (2007) (“Although national 
competition laws certainly differ in many respects, prohibitions against price-fixing and 
‘hardcore’ cartels are nearly universal.”); Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual 
Property Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A Trips Perspective, 7 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 401, 422 (2004) (noting that price fixing is a hardcore antitrust offense). 
 172. See Jacobson & Greer, supra note 36, at 282-83 (“As the Court explained in 
ARCO [Atlantic Richfield], irrespective of the substantive theory, a plaintiff can recover 
only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the defendant’s 
behavior.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 344)). 
 173. See Atl. Richfield, 495 U.S. at 341-42. 
We also reject respondent’s suggestion that no antitrust injury need be shown where a 
per se violation is involved.  The per se rule is a method of determining whether § 1 of 
the Sherman Act has been violated, but it does not indicate whether a private plaintiff 
has suffered antitrust injury and thus whether he may recover damages under § 4 of 
the Clayton Act. 
Id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See, e.g., Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 717 F. Supp. 36, 49 
(D. Conn. 1989) (“In the instant case it appears that NAPC controlled 55% of the 
electric shaver industry subsequent to the merger.  Although this is not as high as the 
market share in Bigelow, it is sufficient to establish a presumption of illegality.”). 
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North American Philips Corp., 176 for example, the court indicated that 
Atlantic Richfield called into question the R.C. Bigelow court’s 
reasoning. In holding that the injury asserted in Remington stemmed 
from an increase in competition rather than from a violation of section 7 
of the Clayton Act, the court essentially ignored the Second Circuit’s 
emphasis on market share.177
B.  An Alternative Interpretation of Cargill 
Courts that differ with the R.C. Bigelow approach take a more 
stringent position toward the threshold required for injunctive relief.  
Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.178 offers a prime example.  The 
Fifth Circuit noted two possible approaches to the merger injunction 
problem.179  It could either focus on the defendant’s past to determine if 
the merged firm would engage in anticompetitive behavior, or it could 
assume that the defendant would engage in anticompetitive behavior 
simply because it is in a position to do so.180  The latter approach 
corresponds to the rule in R.C. Bigelow. 
The Fifth Circuit chose not to assume how the merged entity would 
behave after the merger.181  Instead, the Phototron court interpreted 
Cargill conservatively, noting that standing would only exist if the 
plaintiffs established that the defendant engaged in predatory pricing.182  
Under the Phototron approach, Cargill limits a plaintiff’s ability to seek 
an injunction before suffering harm to cases where monopolistic intent is 
clearly inferable.183  Requiring predatory pricing ensures that the court 
does not enjoin a false positive, namely because the predatory pricing 
immediately parses high market share cases from monopolization 
cases.184
 176. 755 F. Supp. 52, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1991). 
 177. Id. 
 178. 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 179. Id. at 99. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 100 (“[T]he notion that merely facing the specter of a monopoly is 
enough to create standing in a competitor is not the law.”). 
 182. Id. at 102 (“[C]ompetitors must now supply evidence of predatory behavior 
demonstrating a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will be injured.”). 
 183. See id. at 100. 
 184. High market share may be the benign result of producing a superior product or 
taking advantage of efficiencies unavailable to other competitors. See United States v. 
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1996) (“[Plaintiff must show] the willful 
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The plaintiff, Phototron, argued that Kodak operated its wholesale 
facilities at substantially reduced profit margins, if not below cost.185  
Phototron argued that if it sold its goods at the same price, it could not 
make a profit.186  This argument assumes that the costs for the two firms 
were equal,187 a presumption rejected by the Fifth Circuit.188  Instead, 
the court held that the plaintiffs must show that the defendants sold 
below its own costs, not below the plaintiff’s costs.189  Thus, the court 
refused to make assumptions about the market and about how the 
defendant operated its business. 
The plaintiff argued that the merger created a threat of monopolistic 
behavior, and that “[t]he competitor of a monopolist always has standing 
to challenge the monopolistic conduct forcing it from the market.”190  
The Fifth Circuit disagreed and, quoting Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
Cargill, it would not issue an injunction upon the mere showing of “a 
significant probability that the merger will adversely affect competition 
in the market in which the plaintiff must compete.”191  The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that “the notion that merely facing the specter of a monopoly 
is enough to create standing in a competitor is not the law.”192
The Phototron court articulated a stringent approach to injunctions 
under section 16 of the Clayton Act, requiring a substantial likelihood of 
injury for an injunction to issue.193  The Phototron rule, unlike the rule 
in R.C. Bigelow, does not require the court to assume anything about the 
defendant’s conduct after the transaction is consummated.  This rule 
eliminates many of the false positives that the R.C. Bigelow rule might 
acquisition or maintenance of . . . power as distinguished from growth or development 
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); United 
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 385 (1956) (“It could not be 
said that this immense increase in use was solely or even largely attributable to the 
superior quality of cellophane or to the technique or business acumen of du Pont . . . .”). 
 185. Phototron, 842 F.2d at 99. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 100 (“Phototron must present some evidence that Kodak or Colorcraft 
has sold photofinishing services below its cost.”). 
 188. Id. at 99-100. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 100. 
 191. Id. (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 123 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 102 (“[C]ompetitors must now supply evidence of predatory behavior 
demonstrating a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will be injured.”). 
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enjoin, and when compared to the lax standard in R.C. Bigelow, reduces 
the chilling effect on transactions in highly concentrated markets. 
IV.  TOWARDS A BETTER RULE 
 
A.  The Problem With Presumptions 
The Atlantic Richfield decision brought the validity of the R.C. 
Bigelow rule into question.194  However, the precedent remains, standing 
as an extreme pole for what is required to establish antitrust injury under 
section 16 of the Clayton Act.195  The broad proposition that “[m]arket 
share data . . . constitutes sufficient evidence, in and of itself, of antitrust 
injury to a competitor . . .”196 seems to support the premise that a merger 
that creates a large enough market share will be enjoined, regardless of 
the economic effect. 
This proposition causes several problems.  The R.C. Bigelow rule 
fails one of the most important purposes of the standing doctrine: to 
distinguish between monopolistic and efficient actions.197  If competitive 
forces cause high market share, the plaintiffs would lack standing to 
challenge the transaction.198  Hence, the court in Atlantic Richfield 
reasoned that “[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit dominant 
firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price 
competition.”199  The antitrust laws were not meant to discourage the 
competitive conduct of larger entities.200
R.C. Bigelow-like presumptions turn the standing doctrine of 
antitrust injury on its head.  To impute the harms of anticompetitive 
conduct on firms of a particular size converts the antitrust injury 
doctrine into an evaluation of the merits of the case.  To decide that the 
plaintiff will most likely engage in anticompetitive behavior, simply 
 194. See, e.g., Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1167 
(W.D. Ark. 1995); Remington Prods., Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Corp., 755 F. Supp 52, 57-
59 (D. Conn. 1991). 
 195. At the other extreme lies the Phototron rule requiring a substantial likelihood of 
injury. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. 
 196. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 197. See Nostramo, supra note 151, at 178. 
 198. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 
(1977). 
 199. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990) (quoting 
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986)). 
 200. See id. at 340-41. 
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because of its size, requires a court to decide an entire monopolization 
case.  A court must decide what the relevant market is, determine 
whether any barriers to entry exist, and ascertain the likelihood that the 
defendant will engage in anticompetitive conduct.201  Standing, in large 
part, depends on who brings the suit, rather than who is being sued.202  
The inquiry should be whether the individual bringing suit is sufficiently 
endangered by the merger to be in a position to seek its injunction. 
A merger’s purpose clearly affects whether the defendant faces any 
threat of antitrust injury.  Courts struggle to separate the notion of threat 
from an evaluation of the merits of the case.203  However, the focus of 
the inquiry need not remain on the merits.  Assuming that the doctrine is 
a filter preventing the wrong plaintiff from bringing antitrust claims,204 
the proper time to evaluate the merits would be later in an antitrust 
proceeding, when more market data can be ascertained. 
To argue sufficient antitrust injury, one must show a violation of 
the antitrust laws to be so probable that a specific antitrust injury is 
bound to occur.205  The analysis requires a showing of three elements:206 
 201. Such an inquiry is common to both monopolization claims and section 7 claims 
alleging an anticompetitive merger. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
571 (1966) (noting that a product market must be defined in a monopolization claim by 
including reasonable substitutes for a product); United States v. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956) (noting that market definition is a 
precursor to a monopolization claim); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.11 (1997) (defining the relevant market in a 
section 7 claim as one in which a party can impose a “small but significant and 
nontransitory increase” in price). 
 202. The Supreme Court has focused on the plaintiff’s injury as opposed to the 
defendant’s conduct.  The Court also considers the ability to remedy the injury, the 
causation between the injury and the violation of the antitrust laws, and whether the 
plaintiff is the best party to sue for those injuries. See Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-37 (1983). 
 203. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 
(1986). 
 204. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536-37. 
 205. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986).  In order 
to determine whether a causal nexus exists between the alleged antitrust violation and 
the alleged injury, courts do not address the probability of the plaintiff’s argument that 
the antitrust laws have been violated. See id.  One of the reasons why allegations of 
predatory conduct are so problematic in the antitrust injury context is that predatory 
schemes are rare and difficult to execute. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 
(“That predatory pricing seems highly unlikely does not necessarily mean that there 
should be no antitrust rules against it.  But it does suggest that extreme care be taken in 
formulating such rules, lest the threat of litigation, particularly by private parties, 
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(1) The antitrust laws must likely be violated should the transaction 
occur,207 or, in a section 7 case, that a merger is likely to create a 
monopoly or lead to predatory pricing;208 (2) The injury suffered must 
be of the kind that the antitrust laws were meant to prevent;209 (3) 
Causation must exist between the injury and breach of the antitrust 
laws.210
To argue a causal nexus, one must speculate upon what the effects 
of the merger would be, if consummated.211  Granting an injunction 
prior to the occurrence of a transaction212 necessarily involves 
speculation about the effects of the transaction and the prospective 
application of the antitrust laws.213  The R.C. Bigelow presumption, 
however, requires a court to make too many unwarranted inferences.  It 
is one thing to conclude that an increase in price would be the natural 
effect of a merger that creates a concentrated market; it is another to 
assume that a merged entity would begin to charge monopoly rents or 
engage in predatory pricing.  Even if a price increase is likely, applying 
the R.C. Bigelow presumption would require a court to assume that the 
increase arises from a decrease in competition, which is not always the 
case.214  A court may speculate about the likely effects of the merger, 
but cannot make assumptions that direct the inquiry one way or the 
other.  To do so would be to reduce the antitrust injury requirement to an 
injury-in-fact requirement.215
The two assumptions inherent in R.C. Bigelow analysis 
demonstrates that such a rule erodes the causal nexus required to sustain 
materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing.”); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89. 
 206. Cf. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118-22. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 209. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 
(1977). 
 210. See R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 211. Cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (noting that a determination that a firm would 
engage in predatory pricing is inherently speculative). 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Prices can increase for a variety of reasons, such as an increase in the cost of 
production, or the sudden loss of some market efficiencies. 
 215. Although both the injury-in-fact requirement and the antitrust injury 
requirement require some form of causation and redress, the antitrust injury doctrine 
requires causation to tether the injury to the purpose of the laws creating the cause of 
action. 
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an injunction.  First, the court must assume that the merged entity will 
increase prices or engage in predatory conduct.216  Beneath a 
presumption that the merged entity will increase prices is yet another 
assumption that another firm will not simply lower its prices and capture 
market share, or that another firm will not enter and compete with the 
firm directly.217  Specifically, a court must assume sufficient barriers to 
entry into the relevant market exist to ensure that the merged company 
can maintain its price increase.218  In the alternative, the court must 
assume that the market share left for competitors after the merger is 
insufficient to maintain competitive forces.219  For example, a 
competitor with thirty percent of the market share can probably compete 
with the merged company.  Absent predatory pricing, the merged 
company will be forced to keep pace with price competition.  A market 
share of ninety-five percent, however, will likely preclude the 
competitor from directly competing with the merged company on 
price.220  Such a market share, however, will not preclude market entry 
to capture the market share that the merged company loses when it 
increases prices. 
One must presuppose a lot about the relevant market to assume that 
the merged company will increase prices.  First, assumptions about the 
 216. See, e.g., R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 
1989) (distinguishing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1989)). 
 217. Cf. Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698-99 (“[A] firm can anticipate 
monopoly profits for only so long as its monopoly prices do not attract new entry.”). 
 218. See id. 
 219. If demand is sufficiently high and the small share competitor has enough 
capacity to meet a substantial portion of the outstanding demand, the competitor might 
capture a larger share by producing more, bringing down the price of the good and 
undermining the monopolist’s attempt to charge monopoly prices. 
 220. A 95% market share would make it difficult for a rival firm to compete on price 
because it is unlikely that a newcomer can produce enough output to offset the price set 
by the dominant firm. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119. 
In order to succeed in a sustained campaign of predatory pricing, a predator must be 
able to absorb the market shares of its rivals once prices have been cut.  If it cannot do 
so, its attempt at predation will presumably fail, because there will remain in the 
market sufficient demand for the competitors’ goods at a higher price, and the 
competitors will not be driven out of business. 
Id.  Even if the newcomer can produce adequate output to undercut the dominant firm, 
the dominant firm’s prices, brand strength, consumer loyalty, and product innovation 
may still pose a substantial barrier to price competition. Cf. United States v. Von’s 
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 303 n.35 (1966) (noting that firms that fall below a 20% 
market share may still be unlawful where serious barriers to entry exist). 
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strength of barriers to entry or the durability of the competition speaks to 
the merits of the case.221  Showing that the market possesses sufficient 
barriers to entry or that competition has been stifled goes to the heart of 
the substantive claims.222  Second, to assume predatory pricing, the court 
must believe that the merged company can recoup its costs after it has 
eliminated competition.223  For a predatory pricing scheme to work, 
there must not be a competitor in the relevant market that can sustain 
predatory competition for a protracted period of time.224  Additionally, at 
some price point a product substitute might become more viable.225  For 
example, if widget A sells for $5 and widget B sells for $10, and both 
widgets can be used for a similar purpose, a consumer may switch to 
widget B if widget A increases in price to $10.50.226  If the substitute 
sells below the monopoly price, the merged company cannot charge 
monopoly prices. 
Some cases may present facts that warrant such assumptions, some 
may not; therein lies the problem with the R.C. Bigelow presumption.  
All mergers will be treated as pernicious mergers and will be enjoined if 
they possess only one of the indicia of danger—market share 
concentration.  However, the ability to increase prices depends on both 
market share and barriers to entry in the relevant market.  To exclude 
other factors by mechanically enjoining high market share transactions 
would create too many false positives and chill high market share 
mergers, regardless of their potential efficiencies. 
 221. Central to a claim of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act is 
whether barriers-to-entry exist in the relevant market. See United States v. U.S. Steel 
Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 456 (1920). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986) (“The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly 
power for long enough both to recoup the predator’s losses and to harvest some 
additional gain.”). 
 224. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698 (“[A predator must have] greater 
financial staying power than his rivals . . . .”). 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 
(1956) (“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how 
different from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far 
buyers will go to substitute one commodity for another.”). 
 226. For example, in the du Pont case, the court noted that at some point users of 
cellophane wrapping may switch to another cellulose-based wrapping material, or even 
to tin foil, if the cost of cellophane becomes prohibitive. See id. at 400-01. 
2008 ASSESSING ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM 359 
B.  Probability and Predation: Difficulties in Determining the 
Likelihood of Predatory Pricing Before It Happens 
A court might struggle to accurately predict whether a transaction 
will give rise to predatory conduct, or even whether a transaction poses a 
threat of such anticompetitive behavior.  Many commentators have 
expressed doubt as to the rationality of predatory pricing.227  Even if one 
were to concede that there might be some reason to engage in predatory 
pricing, defining the conduct is itself an intractable problem.228  Spotting 
conduct that is improbable and difficult to define before it occurs must 
necessarily be more difficult than identifying it after it occurs. 
Two problems with predatory pricing appear when issuing an 
injunction.  First, it might never be worth it for a firm to engage in 
predatory pricing.229  Further, it might only be rational to engage in 
predatory pricing if some rare market conditions exist.230  Second, 
defining what constitutes predatory pricing is problematic;231 even the 
straightforward definition of pricing below cost does not address which 
cost to use.232  Thus, it is difficult to identify predatory pricing once it 
has occurred, let alone to determine whether predatory pricing will occur 
if a transaction is consummated. 
1.  The Low Probability of Predation: Is Pricing Rational Conduct? 
Ideally, a rule governing injunctive relief in antitrust cases should 
reflect the probability of harm.233  A rule that enjoins transactions in 
 
 227. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699 (“The prospects of an 
adequate future payoff, therefore, will seldom be sufficient to motivate predation.  
Indeed, proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely rare.”); BORK, supra 
note 39, at 144-55. 
 228. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1986). 
 230. K. Craig Wildfang, Predatory Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: 
Do Recent Cases Illuminate the Boundaries?, 31 J. CORP. L. 323, 327 (“[T]here is 
general agreement with the conclusion that successful predatory pricing is a relatively 
rare occurrence, and that there are relatively few markets in which the natural and 
artificial entry barriers are great enough to sustain a sufficient recoupment period of 
monopoly prices to warrant serious antitrust concern.”). 
 231. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
 232. See infra notes 253-62 and accompanying text. 
 233. The standard test for injunctive relief examines both the magnitude of the harm 
that will occur if the court refuses to enjoin certain conduct and the probability of the 
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proportion to their probability of anticompetitive effect will yield the 
fewest false positives.  Thus, the probability of the conduct being 
alleged should play a central role in a court’s antitrust inquiry.  If a court 
determines injunctive relief based on the probability of harm occurring, 
then a predatory pricing claim should be difficult to enjoin.234
The primary criticism of predatory pricing as rational economic 
behavior is that success depends on a series of improbable events.235  To 
assume that a firm will engage in predatory conduct is not just to assume 
the effects of such conduct, but the existence of other preconditions.236  
The string of assumptions required to reach a conclusion of predatory 
conduct has led courts to require “a dangerous probability of actual 
monopolization” resulting from the alleged predation.237  To assume that 
a firm with market dominance will abuse its high market share and 
engage in predation not only assumes that the firm is willing to do so, 
but also that it is in a position to do so successfully. 
Success, however, is often improbable.238  To successfully drive a 
competitor out of the market, a firm must be certain that it can recoup 
the costs of predation.239  It must recoup not only the amount below the 
cost at which it sold its goods, but also the forgone profits.240  During 
the predation period, a firm undergoing such behavior must not only 
manage to eliminate most of its competition, but must also erect 
plaintiff succeeding on the merits of the case. See Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of 
America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003).  Courts do this by examining the balance 
of hardships, the irreparability of the harm, and its imminence. Id.  A rule governing 
antitrust injunctions should be no different.  If a court presumes that a firm will engage 
in improbable conduct, it is divorcing the injunctive relief analysis from its purpose—
protection against imminent and irreversible harm. 
 234. Although the probability of predation is slim, this does not mean there should 
not be a rule prohibiting such conduct. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699.  
The low probability, however, should counsel against assuming that it will occur in 
most cases. 
 235. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1986). 
 236. For a firm to make predation work, the market must be such that the predator 
can expect to recoup its costs. See id. at 589. 
 237. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
222 (1993) (quoting Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993)). 
 238. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589-90; Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699; 
BORK, supra note 39, at 144-55. 
 239. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590. 
 240. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 698. 
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sufficient barriers to entry to prevent a new competitor from moving into 
the market and capturing market share.241   
Nevertheless, improbable does not mean impossible.242  Some 
commentators have noted circumstances in which predatory pricing 
might be worthwhile, albeit difficult to execute.243  While there may be 
few rational economic reasons to engage in predation, there may be 
some strategic reasons to do so.244  A firm may choose to use predation 
as a means of signaling to competitors in another market.245  By 
subjugating its competition in one market, a predator may be able to 
create a fear of retaliation in another market, deterring its competitors 
from engaging in aggressive competition.246  If the net gain from 
controlling the second market is greater than the loss sustained in the 
first market, predatory conduct might not only be a feasible tactic, but a 
rational one. 
To fashion a rule that prevents predation where it is most probable, 
a court may have to view predatory pricing as communication rather 
than profit-maximizing behavior.247  A show of force in one market to 
subordinate competitors in another market is a prime example of 
signaling.248  Another potential motivation for signaling through 
predation is to send competitors false messages.249
A competitor may lower prices below its costs to create the illusion 
that market conditions are unfavorable for entry.250  Such signaling 
assumes incomplete market information, such that competitors do not 
have an accurate picture of market conditions in a market they have not 
 241. See id. at 698-99. 
 242. See id. at 699. 
 243. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 925, 939-42 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 89 HARV. L. REV. 868 (1976). 
 244. See Posner, supra note 244, at 939-40. 
 245. See id. 
 246. Id. at 940 (“If [a predator] sells below cost in one market, his losses there are an 
investment that will be recouped with interest in his other markets in the form of more 
timid competition from the rivals in those markets.”). 
 247. See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare 
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977). 
 248. Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2299-302 (2000). 
 249. “Cost signaling,” a common example, intentionally misrepresents market 
conditions. See id. at 2248. 
 250. See id. 
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yet entered.  Inductively, one can assume that the plausibility of 
predation as a signaling tactic depends largely on the amount of 
information potential competitors have about the relevant market. 
The two possible explanations for predatory conduct described 
above can guide a rule for injunctions.  First, a predator must be likely to 
recoup its predation costs.251  It can do so if it is either signaling to bar a 
competitor from entering in order to achieve some profit-maximizing 
end, or if it is likely to drive out competition from the relevant market 
and erect the necessary barriers to entry to charge monopoly prices.  For 
a court to find that signaling is likely, it will examine, among other 
things, the alleged predator’s incentives and its exposure to other 
markets.  The likelihood of gaining market share depends on whether the 
predator has successfully driven competitors from the market in the past, 
whether it is likely to be able to maintain monopoly prices long enough 
to recoup its losses, and whether it can successfully deter competitors 
from entering the market and engaging in price competition.252
A court must consider all these factors prior to enjoining a 
transaction.  Having a high market share is a precondition to both 
charging monopoly prices and to signaling, but it does not necessarily 
guarantee that a firm will engage in predation for either purpose.  
Maintaining congruence between the probability of injunctive relief and 
the probability of anticompetitive effect requires a court to consider far 
more than market share.  The R.C. Bigelow rule is too mechanical to 
condemn anticompetitive behavior while still fostering and preserving 
competition.  A presumption of antitrust injury based on a ridgid market 
share will condemn anticompetitive and procompetitive behavior alike. 
2.  Problems Defining Predatory Pricing 
Even post-merger it is difficult to determine if a merged company 
has engaged in predatory pricing, since no clear definition of predatory 
pricing exists.253  The main determination courts must make is whether a 
 
 251. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1986). 
 252. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 20 at 698-99. 
 253. The United States Courts of Appeals differ on what measure of cost should be 
used to determine if a firm is engaging in predatory pricing. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 n.1 (1993) (noting the 
disagreement among circuit courts over the appropriate measure of cost in predation 
cases).  The Supreme Court left this issue unresolved. See id. 
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firm has engaged in pricing below costs.254  Fixed costs remain constant 
regardless of output, while variable costs increase or decrease with 
changes in output.255  To measure a firm’s costs for the purpose of 
predation, the variable cost per increase in unit output, called the 
marginal cost, 256 is the most important metric.257  Typically, marginal 
cost rises as a plant reaches capacity.258
Measuring a firm’s marginal cost is difficult, so simply comparing 
the price of goods to marginal cost becomes problematic.259  While 
using marginal cost as the benchmark for determining whether a firm 
has engaged in predatory pricing would be ideal, it is difficult to 
determine what it costs a firm to produce and sell its last unit of 
goods.260  Average variable cost, which is “the sum of all variable costs 
divided by output,” is another option, but this metric is also imperfect.261  
Average variable cost will not reveal if the firm’s rationale for engaging 
in predation is strategic, rather than purely economic. 
Regardless of which definition of cost one adopts, the necessary 
data to compute cost is often unavailable because the transaction has not 
yet occurred.  The costs of a merged company might be much lower than 
the costs of each company by itself because the merger might have 
created production efficiencies.262  Therefore, absent data about what 
costs will be after a merger, cost predictions may be inaccurate.  
Determining whether a firm has engaged in predatory pricing when a 
court has complete information is difficult enough; doing so while 
speculating about a firm’s post-transaction costs risks inaccuracy. 
 254. Most scholars agree that predatory pricing is the pricing of goods below some 
measure of cost. See, e.g., Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 699; Bravo & Siciliani, 
supra note 20, at 258; Foer, supra note 20, at 1319 (“The illegal act of predatory pricing 
is defined as setting one’s prices below an appropriate measure of cost, with the ability 
to later raise prices sufficiently to recapture the investment made in below-cost 
pricing.”). 
 255. Areeda & Turner, supra note 20, at 700. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 716-17. 
 260. See id. at 700-02. 
 261. See id. at 700. 
 262. A merger may yield benefits resulting from economies of scale in production, 
or from joint marketing efforts by the individual firms. See F.M. SCHERER & D. ROSS, 
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 159-67 (Houghton 
Mifflin 3d ed. 1990). 
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A court will have to make potentially erroneous assumptions about 
market conditions and about the efficiencies of the proposed transaction.  
It will not only have to assume that a post-transaction entity can charge a 
monopoly price, but that the data could support a finding of predatory or 
monopoly pricing.  In other words, the court must both make 
assumptions about a firm’s costs and decide on a definition of cost, 
without necessary market information. 
One cannot decide whether a firm is signaling without 
understanding a firm’s motives within the relevant market.  To properly 
signal to an adjacent market that the predator will not tolerate aggressive 
price competition, competitors must know definitively that the predator 
is selling goods below cost.  Thus, the predator must not only price 
below its costs, but below what the competitors believe to be the general 
cost of doing business.  Sometimes this cost can be difficult to 
determine.  Other times the cost will be readily ascertainable by the 
competition because the price of raw materials may govern the ultimate 
price of the good.  Essentially, the purpose of the predatory conduct will 
determine which metric of cost is appropriate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The decision to grant injunctive relief is a difficult one because a 
court has little choice but to speculate about what would happen if it 
does not act.  Often, the line between legal and illegal conduct in 
antitrust law is a thin one.  A high market share may mean that a firm is 
operating at levels of efficiency at which its competition cannot 
compete, or it may mean that it has a superior product.  It can also mean 
that the firm is in a position to abuse its power over the market to secure 
a dominant position and charge monopoly prices.  Before a merger or 
any affirmative conduct by the dominant firm, a court only has the 
market share and other concentration metrics, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, upon which to rely.263  These metrics are often 
 263. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a quantitative means of calculating market 
concentration.  It is obtained by adding the square of all the market shares in a relevant 
product market. See Ark. Elec. Energy Consumers v. F.E.R.C., 290 F.3d 362, 370 n.6 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index refers to a measurement of market 
concentration that ‘is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares 
of all the participants.’” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1997))).  Courts will sometimes rely on the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to determine how many competitors make up the majority 
2008 ASSESSING ANTICOMPETITIVE HARM 365 
 
indeterminate and agnostic about whether a firm is likely to employ 
anticompetitive tactics. 
A rule like that in R.C. Bigelow enjoins a transaction based on the 
market share and concentration metrics alone.  As a result, the antitrust 
injury requirement is effectively reduced to an injury-in-fact 
requirement.  The doctrine can no longer function as a parsing 
mechanism, separating perniciously dominant positions from benign 
ones.  By presuming the existence of antitrust injury, a court must 
presume quite a bit about the market the firm is in, and the effect on the 
market after the transaction is consummated.  A court must assume that 
a firm can recoup its losses, erect sufficient barriers to entry, and engage 
in price competition.  If a firm cannot seal off the market, it cannot 
recoup its losses by charging monopoly prices. 
The most problematic assumption that a court can make is that a 
firm will engage in predatory pricing once it has secured a dominant 
position in the market.  Predatory pricing is highly unlikely to occur 
because it is a difficult tactic to pull off.  Not only must a firm recoup its 
losses from pricing goods below its costs, it must also have the staying 
power to outlast its competition.  Even in cases in which a firm may be 
using the predatory conduct as a signaling mechanism, it is incredibly 
difficult to define and identify predatory pricing, particularly when it has 
not yet happened. 
A more defensible approach to antitrust injury will make as few 
presumptions as possible.  The most proactive method of avoiding 
unwarranted assumptions about a firm and the market is to avoid 
mechanical antitrust injury rules.  In particular, a court should never 
presume the existence of antitrust injury and should always examine the 
causal nexus between the purposes of the antitrust laws and the injury 
asserted rather carefully.  There is no substitute for carefully examining 
the injury and the likelihood that the injury was caused by something the 
antitrust laws were meant to prevent.  A mechanical condemnation of 
high market share mergers by injunction cannot succeed.  Such a rule 
risks discouraging innovation and stifling merger activity. 
 
of the relevant market. See id. at 369-70. 
